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This paper shows how to shadow price partially traded goods following
the standard rules of cost-benefit analysis, i.e. identifying the individuals
affected, measuring their corresponding compensating variations, and
aggregating those measures according to a distributional value
judgement. The analysis is conducted in a partial equilibrium
framework, allowing for direct operational application.
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In a recent paper, Little and Mirrlees (1991, p. 353) reiterated their previous argument
(Little and Mirrlees, 1974, p. 229) regarding the pricing of goods that are partially traded at
the margin: "When price varies with the amount of trade, it is not exactly right to use
marginal revenues and costs", adding that in such circumstances proper pricing "has tended
to be neglected". This paper shows how to price partially traded goods following the
standard rules of cost-benefit analysis, i.e. identifying the individuals affected, measuring their
corresponding compensating variations and aggregating those measures according to a
distributional value judgement. To that effect, two basic scenarios will be considered in the
domestic market: perfect competition and pure monopoly. Although not all possible cases
will be analyzed, those selected should be useful in guiding the analysis of those omitted.
The presentation follows the approach used in Londero (1987) and the analysis is conducted
in a partial equilibrium framework, allowing for direct operational application.
1. Introduction
A good is said to be internationally traded at the margin (imported or exported), or
simply traded, when the adjustment to an additional demand or supply of that commodity is
made entirely through a change in its exports or imports.
1 Conversely, a good is said to be
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1 Note that the definition depends on what actually happens with the corresponding exports or imports, and
not on what would potentially happen if export and import incentives and disincentives were altered or eliminated.
In the latter case we speak of tradable (importable or exportable) goods.2 Shadow Pricing Partially Traded Goods
non-traded at the margin when the adjustment to an additional domestic demand or supply
does not directly affect imports or exports. It follows from the above definition that for non-
traded goods the adjustment must take place either through changes in production (produced
at the margin), changes in the allocation among alternative domestic uses (non-produced at
the margin), or a combination of both. Finally, when the adjustment to an additional
domestic demand or supply directly affects both trade and domestic production or allocation
among domestic users, the good is said to be partially traded.
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The valuation of partially traded goods, as their name suggests, must take into account
the effects on both the foreign exchange and the domestic markets. In this paper we will
analyze several cases of partially traded consumption goods and deduce the corresponding
pricing rules. Our approach will be to treat foreign and domestic markets separately, and
allocate the effects of an additional supply or demand accordingly. We will start by
presenting the case of two consumers and a non-traded good, and then build upon this
example to analyze the cases of partially exported and imported consumer goods.
The analysis is conducted only for consumer goods. The analytical complications
introduced by intermediate goods are not exclusive of partially traded goods and will not add
to the main objective of the paper. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that there are no
indirect taxes or subsidies to domestic sales (domestic market and basic prices are equal).
Taking them into account would complicate the tables considerably without contributing
much to the understanding of the problem. It is also assumed throughout that taxes are mere
transfers with zero efficiency value, i.e. allocative effects of financing the impact on
government budgets (Drèze and Stern, 1987; Squire, 1989) are ignored. Finally, accounting
prices of investment are all assumed to be equal to one.
2. Two consumers and a non-traded good
Let us consider the simple case depicted in Figure 1 of an investment project
2 Note that the definition does not require that the international price be affected. Cf. Little and Mirrlees
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increasing the supply of a non-traded good consumed by only two persons purchasing q(p0)
Figure 1. A supply increase
at price p0, and sold under competitive conditions so that producers are price takers. When
price falls to p1 due to the supply shift (Dq
s + Dq
dt), the measures of consumers’ gains are the
corresponding compensating variations (CVs). In Table 1 these CVs have been approximated
by the corresponding changes in consumers’ surpluses.
3 The first consumer gains area (A
+ B) measured by using his individual demand curve. This can also be presented as his
savings in purchasing the original amount q(p0), i.e. area A, plus his willingness to pay for
his additional consumption (B + C), less what he actually pays for that additional
consumption (C). The second consumer also gains his savings in purchasing the original
amount (B + D + E + F), plus his willingness to pay for the additional consumption
(H + I − B − C), less what he actually pays for it (I − C).
Turning now to producers’ income changes, the amount the consumers pay for the
additional consumption is additional revenue for the project (I). Similarly, the amount the
3 Londero (1987, Appendix A) shows that in most practical cases, the difference between the CV and the
change in the consumer’s surplus is not significant. Also see Mishan (1981a, Ch. 7, and 1981b, Part V) for special
qualifications in the case of rents (producers’ surplus).4 Shadow Pricing Partially Traded Goods
Table 1. Two consumers
Consumer Consumer Domestic
Project 1 2 Producers Total
Consumers’ CV
Purchases of q(p0)+ A +(B+D+E+F)− ( A+B+D+E+F)
Willingness to pay for Dq +(B+C)+ ( H+I−B−C)+ ( H+I)
Amount paid for Dq +I −C −(I−C)
Producers’ income changes
Sales reduction at p1 +G −G
Cost savings +(F+G)+ ( F+G)
Total +(I+G)+ ( A+B)+ ( D+E+F+H)− ( A+B+D+E)+ ( H+I)+(F+G)
consumers save due to the price reduction is a revenue loss for the remaining producers, who
also reduce their sales in G when valued at p1. (Note that if measured at p0, the sales
reduction is E + F + G, but we have already accounted for E + F.) When reducing their
sales, however, they no longer incur the corresponding production costs, assumed here to
equal (F + G).
When we sum the columns of Table 1 we obtain the income changes of each one
affected by the project: the additional revenue for the project, the consumers’ compensating
variations, and the revenue lost by the other producers of q. Recalling that we assumed that
accounting prices of investment funds were all equal to one, and that no allocative effects
were attributable to financing the impact on government budgets, in order to calculate the
total benefits attributable to the project we only need a distributional value judgement that
would allow us to express the change in "total welfare" as a function of measures of
individual welfare changes. When such a value judgement translates into assigning equal
valuations to the marginal income changes of all persons, we obtain the so-called "efficiency
value" of the project’s additional supply. Since equal valuations translate into unitary
weights, and assuming that long-run marginal cost at market prices (F + G) equals that at
"efficiency" prices, the last column of Table 1 provides us with the standard result for the
"efficiency" value of the project’s sales when accounting prices of investment funds are equal
to one and there are no allocative effects originating in the financing of government budgets;
i.e. the willingness to pay for the additional consumption plus the value of the resourcesShadow Pricing Partially Traded Goods 5
released by replacing other producers.
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3. Exports: basic prices are equal
Supply increases
The preceding method can also be applied to the case of an exported good. Let us
first consider the case of an increase in the supply of the exported good when domestic and
export basic prices are equal, i.e. when producers are price takers. In Figure 2, S will be
domestic supply, DD will be domestic demand, DI will be international demand, and SI will
be total international supply. By increasing supply in the foreign market, the additional
domestic supply Dq
s + Dq
dt reduces price in both markets increasing domestic consumption
Dq
d, reducing output of other domestic producers Dq
s, and increasing exports Dq
dt − Dq
d.
Initially, we will further assume that product q is not subject to export taxes or
subsidies and that the difference between the market and the "efficiency" price of foreign
exchange is fully explained by taxes. That situation is presented in Table 2, where a column
for the government has been added in order to register the changes in import and export tax
revenue (transfers) brought about by the net additional foreign exchange.
5 Considering that
in cost-benefit analysis we are normally concerned only with the welfare of residents, income
changes of "foreigners" have been treated separately.
The columns for the project, the domestic consumers, and the domestic producers are
identical to the corresponding columns in Table 1. The column for the government shows
the changes in tax revenue originating in the changes in exports and imports, i.e. the
"efficiency" premium of foreign exchange. In other words, it shows that the "efficiency"
price ratio of foreign exchange, or ratio of the efficiency to the market exchange rate, is
4 If the rate of discount were not equal to the marginal efficiency rate of return, we would have accounting
prices of investment funds different from one (UNIDO, 1972; Londero, 1987). If that were the case, and under the
assumption that savings are, ceteris paribus, a function of welfare levels (and not only monetary income), we would
be able to use the results of Table 1 to apply UNIDO’s approach. See Londero (1987, Part III).
5 See Londero (1987, Ch. 3).6 Shadow Pricing Partially Traded Goods
Figure 2. An increase in the supply of exports
Table 2. An increase in the supply of exports (basic prices are equal, no export
taxes or subsidies
Domestic Domestic Domestic
Project Consumers Producers Government Total Foreigners Total
Consumers’ CV
Purchases of q(p0)+ A −(A+B+D+E+F)− a(B+D+E+F) −(1+a)(B+D+E+F)+ ( B+D+E+F)
Willingness to pay for Dq +(B+C)+ ( B+C)+ ( H+I−B−C)+ ( H+I)
Amount paid for Dq +I −C a(I−C) (1+a)(I−C)− ( I−C)
Producers’ income changes
Sales reduction at p1 +G −G
Cost savings +(F+G)+ ( F+G)+ ( F+G)
Total +(I+G)+ ( A+B)− ( A+B+D+E) a(I−C−B−D−E−F)+ ( B+C)+(F+G)+ +(D+E+F+H)+ ( H+I)+(F+G)
(1+a)(I−C−B−D−E−F)
Source: Figure 2.Shadow Pricing Partially Traded Goods 7
(1 + a).
6 Finally, the Domestic Total column registers the sum of the income changes
attributable to the additional supply of the project, i.e. its value at "efficiency" prices. It
captures all the income changes of residents: the willingness to pay for the additional
domestic consumption (B + C), the value of the resources released by replacing domestic
producers (F + G), and the net foreign exchange generated by the project, the marginal export
revenue (I − C − B − D − E − F), valued at "efficiency" prices. That net additional foreign
exchange originates in two main sources: first, in the value of the additional exports at price
p1 (I − C), resulting from total additional sales less additional sales to the domestic market;
and second, in the loss of foreign exchangedue to the fall in price (B + D + E + F).
Note that if foreign demand faced by the exporting country had been infinitely elastic
(the "small-country" assumption), the price change would have been nil. Consequently, the
whole production of the project would have constituted additional exports, and there would
have been no effects on domestic consumers or producers. In other words, we would have
reached the standard border price rule of "efficiency" analysis for goods that are fully
exported at the margin.
7
Also note that Table 2 accounts for only part of the effects on "foreigners", since the
price reduction will affect foreign consumers in more than the effects from sales originating
in this country and there will be effects on foreign producers.
Let us now consider the case when exports are subject to an ad valorem tax at the rate
t, i.e. the domestic price p
d will be equal to
p
d = p
fob (1 − t)
the f.o.b. price plus the export tax. This is the price that will be faced by the producer and
is designated by p0 or p1 in Figure 2. Consequently, the foreign exchange component of the
6 When goods are partially traded, the whole difference between the "efficiency" and the market exchange
rate may not be explained by taxes alone. The assumption is used here only to simplify the presentation.
7 In practice, estimates of demand and supply price elasticities will be required. The Appendix derives the





In this case, some changes need to be introduced into our preceding analysis, but in order to
make them, we need to know how the project allocates its sales between the domestic and
the foreign markets. Let us assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the project will export
all of its production, and, consequently, that it will be the remaining domestic producers that
will change their sales to the domestic market. If that is the case, when exports are taxed,
additional sales revenue for the project is no longer I + G, but
(I + G)/( 1−t)
However, only part of this sum will be appropriated by the project, as it will pay the
government taxes in the amount of
t (I + G)/( 1−t)
So, the final result will be a revenue increase of (I + G), as shown in Table 2a. As regards
domestic producers, their revenue losses due to the price reduction will now be
A +( B + D + E + F)/( 1−t)
but they will pay less export taxes to the government in the amount of
t (B + D + E + F)/( 1−t)
At the same time, instead of receiving export revenue
C /( 1−t)
at price p1, they will receive C for the additional domestic sales, and they will no longer pay9
Table 2a. An increase in the supply of exports (basic prices are equal, there are export taxes)
Domestic Domestic Domestic
Project Consumers Producers Government Total Foreigners Total
Consumers’ CV
Purchases of q(p0)+ A −A−(B+D+E+F)/(1−t)− a(B+D+E+F)/(1−t) −(1+a)(B+D+E+F)/(1−t)+ ( B+D+E+F)(1−t)− a(B+D+E+F)/(1−t)
Willingness to pay for Dq +(B+C)+ ( B+C) +[(H+I)−(B+C)]/(1−t)+ ( H+I)/(1−t)+t(B+C)
Amount paid for Dq +I/(1−t)− C +C−[C/(1−t)] a(I−C)/(1−t) (1+a)(I−C)/(1−t)− ( I−C)/(1−t) a(I−C)/(1−t)
Export tax due to Dq −tI/(1−t)+ tC/(1−t)+ t(I−C)/(1−t)
Export tax due to Dp +t(B+D+E+F)/(1−t)− t(B+D+E+F)/(1−t)
Producers’ income changes
Sales reduction at p1 +G/(1−t)− G/(1−t)
Export tax −tG/(1−t)+ tG/(1−t)
Cost savings +(F+G)+ ( F+G)+ ( F+G)
Total +(I+G)+ ( A+B)− ( A+B+D+E)( a+t)(I−C−B−D−E−F)/(1−t)+ ( B+C)+(F+G)+ +(D+E+F+H)/(1−t)+ ( H+I)/(1−t)+(F+G)+
(1+a)(I−C−B−D−E−F)/(1−t) a(I−C−B−D−E−F)/(1−t)
t(B+C)
Source: Figure 2.10 Shadow Pricing Partially Traded Goods
export taxes in the amount of
tC/( 1−t)
Finally, they will no longer sell Dq
s, with a value of G /( 1−t) at price p1, and will no longer
pay the corresponding export tax of
tG/( 1−t)
The sales reduction will save the corresponding long-run marginal cost F + G. The net effect
on government revenue of the additional exports and the international price reduction will
include the changes in tax revenue due to the use of the additional foreign exchange, plus that
originating in the additional exports of q, less the effect of the price reduction, i.e.
(a + t)
(I − C − B − D − E − F)
(1 − t)
The final efficiency result is the same as before, i.e. the willingness to pay for the
additional domestic consumption (B + C), plus the value of the resources released by
replacing domestic producers (F + G), plus the marginal export revenue valued at "efficiency"
prices [(1 + a)(I − C − B − D − E − F)/( 1−t)]. Had demand faced by domestic producers
been infinitely elastic, we would have obtained the standard result: all additional production
by the project would have constituted additional exports and the efficiency value of the
additional supply of q would have been that of the corresponding amount of foreign
exchange.
Demand increases
Let us now turn to Figure 3, which allows us to consider the case of a change in the
domestic demand for the (at the margin partially) exported good. To consider the most
common case, let us say that domestic demand in the "without project situation" (DD)Shadow Pricing Partially Traded Goods 11
Figure 3 An increase in the domestic demand for exports (basic prices are equal)
Table 3. An increase in the domestic demand for exports (basic prices are equal,
no export taxes or subsidies)
Domestic Domestic Domestic
Project Consumers Producers Government Total Foreigners Total
Consumers’ CV
Purchases of q(p1)− A (A+B+D)+ a(B+D) +(1+a)(B+D)− ( B+D)+ a(B+D)
Willingness to pay for Dq −(B+C)− ( B+C)− ( F+G−B−C)− ( F+G)
Amount paid for Dq −G +C −a(G−C) −(1+a)(G−C)+ ( G−C)− a (G−C)
Producers’ income changes
Domestic sales at p1 −(I+E+H+F)+ ( I+E+H+F)
Cost savings −(H+I)− ( H+I)− ( H+I)
Total −(G+I+E+H+F)− ( A+B)+ ( A+B+D+E+F) a(B+D+C−G) +(1+a)(B+D−G+C)− −(D+F)− ( F+G)−(H+I)+
(B+C)−(H+I) a(B+D−G+C)
Source: Figure 3.12 Shadow Pricing Partially Traded Goods
increases by (Dq
s + Dq
dt), raising price from p0 to p1, and generating the effects presented in Table
3 and explained below.
The project purchases an additional quantity of q at the new price, paying
p1 (Dq
s + Dq
dt)=G + F + E + H + I
part of which is additional revenue for the domestic producers (F + E + H + I), andpart of which
is the amount that foreign consumers previously paid for Dq
dt. Domestic consumers loose their CVs
of the price increase (A + B) while domestic producers gain the effects of the price increase. Due
to the effect of the higher f.o.b. price, the government receives the additional tax revenue implicit
in the foreign exchange premium. The higher price increases the foreign exchange earned by the
amount of exports corresponding to the "with project situation" (B + D), but reduces the foreign
exchange revenue due to the reduction in the volume of exports valued at p0 (G − C). Finally,
foreign consumers loose their CVs of the price increase, part of which is (D + F).
The Domestic Total column indicates the sum of the CVs of all those affected, or value of
the additional demand at "efficiency" prices, resulting in: the willingness to pay for the reduction in
domestic consumption (B + C), the value of the resources used to produce the additional quantity
Dq
s (H + I), and the value at "efficiency" prices of the net effect on foreign exchange earnings
(marginal export revenue)
(1 + a)(B + D − G + C)
Note that if all consumers were domestic, the Government column would not exist and the sum of
all the CVs would have been the traditional "efficiency" result: the willingness to pay for the
reduction in consumption (F + G) plus the cost of producing the additional quantity Dq
s (H + I). On
the other hand, had foreign demand been infinitely elastic, the total cost at "efficiency" prices would
have been equal to that of the foreign exchange forgone due to the reduction in exports, i.e. the
standard "border price rule".
As in the case of the export tax, if the exporters were beneficiaries of an ad valorem export
subsidy, the distribution of the real income changes becomes slightly more complicated because weShadow Pricing Partially Traded Goods 13
now have to take into account the changes in government revenue brought about by the price change.




fob (1 + s)
The results are presented in Table 3a. There we can see that there are two important
differences when compared with the case when there are no export subsidies (Table 3): i) that in
order to express foreign exchange flows correctly, the corresponding domestic currency flows have
been divided by (1 + s); and ii) that in this case the government is also affected by the export
subsidy it pays, i.e. the net effect of the higher price and the smaller volume of exports. The
"efficiency" cost of providing the additional amount of q to the project, recorded as the Domestic
Total, is composed of the willingness to pay for the reduction in the domestic consumption (B + C),
plus the cost of the additional production (H + I), less the efficiency value of the marginal export
revenue (1 + a)(B + D − G + C)/(1 + s) gained due to the price increase. Here, also, had foreign
supply faced by the domestic consumers been infinitely elastic, the result would have been the border
price value of the forgone exports times the efficiency price ratio of foreign exchange.
Once again, if all consumers were domestic, and consequently s = a = 0, we would obtain
the standard "efficiency" result: the willingness to pay for the reduction in
consumption (F + G) plus the cost of producing the additional quantity (H + I).
4. Exports: price discrimination
Foreign demand is infinitely elastic
So far, we have considered cases in competitive markets, where sellers are price takers. Let
us now consider the case of a good produced by a perfectly discriminating monopolist benefitting
from a prohibitive tariff and facing an infinitely elastic foreign demand, depicted in Figure 4(a). The





Table 3a. An increase in the domestic demand for exports (basic prices are equal, there are export subsidies)
Domestic Domestic Domestic
Project Consumers Producers Government Total Foreigners Total
Consumers’ CV
Purchases of q(p1)− A +A
Willingness to pay for Dq −(B+C)− ( B+C)− ( F+G−B−C)/(1+s)[ s(B+C)−(F+G)]/(1+s)
Amount paid for Dq −G/(1+s)+ C −C+C/(1+s)− a(G−C)/(1+s) −(1+a)(G−C)/(1+s)+ ( G−C)/(1+s)− ( a+s)(G−C)/(1+s)
Export subsidy due to Dq −sG/(1+s) sC/(1+s) s(G−C)/(1+s)
Producers’ income changes
Sales at p1 −(F+E+H+I)+ ( B+D)/(1+s)+(F+E+H+I)+ a(B+D)/(1+s) +(1+a+s)(B+D)/(1+s)− ( B+D)/(1+s)+ ( a+s)(B+D)/(1+s)
Export subsidy due to Dp +s(B+D)/(1+s)− s(B+D)/(1+s)− s(B+D)/(1+s)− s(B+D)/(1+s)
Cost savings −(H+I)− ( H+I)− ( H+I)
Total −(G+F+E+H+I)− ( A+B)+ ( A+B+D+F+E)( a−s)(B+D+C−G)/(1+s) +(1+a)(B+D−G+C)/(1+s)− −(D+F)/(1+s)[ s(B+C)−(F+G)]/(1+s)−
(B+C)−(H+I)( H+I)+a(B+D−G+C)/(1+s)
Source: Figure 3.Shadow Pricing Partially Traded Goods 15




d are total, foreign, and domestic marginal revenues, respectively, and c is
marginal cost.
8 Consequently, in the case of Figure 4.(a), total production is fully
determined by foreign marginal revenue y
x =p
x and marginal cost c. However, due to the
prohibitive tariff, the domestic producer is able to distribute that production between markets
by setting profit maximizing price p
d
0 in the domestic market. In such a case, an increase in
the monopolist’s supply will not affect the domestic market, i.e. for supply increases, the
good is fully exported at the margin because the international price cannot be affected by the
domestic monopolist.
However, an increase in the domestic demand for q good would affect both domestic
consumption (Dq
d) and exports (Dq
x), fitting our definition of a partially traded good, while
domestic production is not affected because foreign marginal revenue p
x is not affected. The
project purchases the amount Dq = Dq
d + Dq







x)=B + C + D + E + F + G
shown as a revenue loss for the project in Table 4. Of that amount, C + D was previously
paid by domestic consumers and G by foreign buyers, so that the revenue change for the
monopolist originating in the sale of Dq is only B + E + F. The price increase brought about
by the additional domestic demand generates additional revenue for the monopolist (A) and
creates a loss to the consumers measured by their CVs (A + B). Finally, the government loses
aG in tax revenue due to the reduction in the supply of foreign exchange p
x Dq
x. As a result,
the value at "efficiency" prices of the additional demand is the willingness to pay for the
reduction in domestic consumption plus the "efficiency value" of the reduction in the supply
of foreign exchange.
Note that what makes the good partially traded is the increase in the domestic price,
which explains the reduction in domestic consumption. If the domestic price were not
affected, as in Figure 4(b), due for example to an import tariff that imposes an upper limit
p
d
0 on the domestic price, the good would be fully exported at the margin.
8 See Ferguson and Gould (1975) or Henderson and Quandt (1971).Shadow Pricing Partially Traded Goods 17
Table 4. An increase in the domestic demand for exports (price discrimination)
Domestic
Project Consumers Monopolist Government Total
Consumers’ CV
Purchases of q(p0)− A +A
Willingness to pay for Dq −(B+C+D)− ( B+C+D)
Amount paid for Dq −(C+D)+ ( C+D)
Producers’ income changes
Exports reduction −G −aG −(1+a)G
Additional income −(B+E+F)+ ( B+E+F)
Total −(B+C+D+E+F+G)− ( A+B)+ ( A+B+E+F)− aG −(B+C+D)−(1+a)G
Source: Figure 4.
Table 4a. An increase in the domestic demand for exports (price discrimination and
export subsidies)
Domestic
Project Consumers Monopolist Government Total
Consumers’ CV
Purchases of q(p0)− A +A
Willingness to pay for Dq −(B+C+D)− ( B+C+D)
Amount paid for Dq −(C+D)+ ( C+D)
Producers’ income changes
Exports reduction −G/(1+s)− aG/(1+s) −(1+a)G/(1+s)
Export subsidy +sG/(1+s)− s G/(1+s)
Additional income −(B+E+F)+ ( B+E+F)
Total −(B+C+D+E+F+G)− ( A+B)+ ( A+B+E+F)− ( a+s)G/(1+s)− ( B+C+D)−(1+a)G/(1+s)
Source: Figure 4.18 Shadow Pricing Partially Traded Goods
If exports of q were subsidized at the ad valorem rate s, the (basic) export price faced
by the discriminating monopolist would be
p
x = p
fob (1 + s)
Then, the only change to our preceding example would be that of the effect on government
revenue (Table 4a). As the foreign exchange value of the reduction in exports would only
be G /( 1+s), the change in government revenue would be −(a + s) G /( 1+s).
Foreign demand is not infinitely elastic
When the domestic monopolist does not face an infinitely elastic foreign demand










1 in Figure 5), which in turn will affect both domestic and international
prices. As a result, the adjustment will include reductions in both domestic and foreign
consumption (Dq
dd, Dq
x), as well as an increase in production (Dq
s). The corresponding
income changes are presented in Table 5. The project purchases Dq = DT0 − DT1 in the
domestic market, paying a total of (B + D + C + E). The domestic consumers lose their CV
of the price increase (A + B). The monopolist gains the domestic price increase times the
new domestic sales (A + B + D), plus the export price increase times the new export sales
(F), plus the additional sales to the domestic market valued at p
d
0 (E), less the reduction in




0 price increase (H), and less the additional costs to produce
Dq
s (I). Government tax revenue is affected by the net change in foreign exchange (F − H),
and finally, foreign consumers lose their CVs of the export price increase. As expected, theShadow Pricing Partially Traded Goods 19
Figure 5 An increase in the domestic demand for exports (monopoly power in both
markets)
domestic cost at efficiency prices is equal to the willingness to pay for the reduction in
domestic consumption (B + C), plus the additional cost of increasing the production of q (I),
plus the efficiency value of the net change in foreign exchange (1 + a)(F − H). As in the
previous cases, had all consumers been domestic, the government would not have been
affected and the efficiency cost would have been the willingness to pay for the reduction in
domestic consumption plus the marginal cost of increasing production.
If the monopolist is subject to an ad valorem export tax at rate t, then the additional
demand will have further effects on government revenues, as presented in Table 5a. The
government will not only receive additional revenue due to the use of the additional foreign
exchange, but will also be affected by the change in tax revenue originated in the marginal
export revenue (F − H).
Let us now consider the case of an increase in the supply of exports depicted in
Figure 6. The monopolist introduces a technical change represented by the shift in his long-20
Table 5. An increase in the domestic demand for exports (monopoly power in both markets)
Domestic Domestic
Project Consumers Monopolist Government Total Foreigners Total
Consumers’ CV
Purchases of q(p1)− A (A+F)+ aF +(1+a)F −F +aF
Willingness to pay for Dq −(B+C)− ( B+C)− ( G+H)− ( B+C+G+H)
Amount paid for Dq −C +C −H −aH −(1+a)H +H −aH
Producers’ income changes
Domestic sales at p1 −(B+D+E)+ ( B+D+E)
Additional costs −I −I −I
Total −(B+D+C+E)− ( A+B)+ ( A+B+D+F+E−H−I a(F−H) +(1+a)(F−H)−I−(B+C)− ( F+G)− ( B+C)−(G+H)−I+a(F−H)
Source: Figure 5.
Table 5a. An increase in the domestic demand for exports (monopoly power in both markets and export taxes)
Domestic Domestic
Project Consumers Monopolist Government Total Foreigners Total
Consumers’ CV
Purchases of q(p1)− A A+[F/(1−t)] +aF/(1−t) +(1+a)F/(1−t)− F/(1−t)+ aF/(1−t)
Willingness to pay for Dq −(B+C)− ( B+C)− ( G+H)/(1−t)− ( B+C)−(G+H)/(1−t)
Amount paid for Dq −C +C −H/(1−t)− aH/(1−t) −(1+a)H/(1−t)+ H/(1−t)− aH/(1−t)
Export taxes −t(F−H)/(1−t)t ( F−H)/(1−t)
Producers’ income changes
Domestic sales at p1 −(B+D+E)+ ( B+D+E)
Additional costs −I −I −I
Total −(B+D+C+E)− ( A+B)+ ( A+B+D+F+E−H−I)( a+t)(F−H)/(1−t) +(1+a)(F−H)/(1−t)− −(F+G)/(1−t)− ( B+C)−(G+H)/(1−t)−
I−(B+C) I+a(F−H)/(1−t)
Source: Figure 5.Shadow Pricing Partially Traded Goods 21



















monopolist’s revenue by the additional sales (C + F) and reducing it due to the lower prices
(−A − D). The price reduction benefits both domestic and foreign consumers in an amount
equal to their corresponding CVs,( A + B) and (D + E), respectively. Finally, the government
sees its tax revenue affected by the net change in the supply of foreign exchange. The final
efficiency result is (Table 6), as it might be expected, the efficiency value of the net change
in the supply of foreign exchange [(1 + a)(F − D)], plus the willingness to pay for the
additional domestic consumption, less the additional cost at efficiency prices. Had all
consumers been domestic, the final result would have been the willingness to pay for the
additional consumption, less the additional costs.
If exports were subject to an ad valorem tax (Table 6a), the government would also
Figure 6 An increase in the supply of exports (monopoly power in both markets)22
Table 6. An increase in the supply of exports (monopoly power in both markets)
Domestic Domestic
Consumers Monopolist Government Total Foreigners Total
Consumers’ CV
Purchases of q(p1) A −(A+D)− aD −(1+a)D +D −aD
Willingness to pay for Dq +(B+C)+ ( B+C)+ ( E+F)+ ( B+C+E+F)
Amount paid for Dq −C +(C+F)+ aF +(1+a)F −F +aF
Producers’ income changes
Additional costs DLRMgC DLRMgC DLRMgC
Total (A+B)− ( C+F−A−D)+DLRMgC a(F−D) +(1+a)(F−D)+(B+C)+DLRMgC +(D+E)+ ( B+C+E+F)+(1+a)(F−D)+DLRMgC
Source: Figure 6.
Table 6a. An increase in the supply of exports (monopoly power in both markets and export taxes)
Domestic Domestic
Consumers Monopolist Government Total Foreigners Total
Consumers’ CV
Purchases of q(p1) A −A+[D/(1−t)] +aD −(1+a)D +D/(1−t)− aD/(1−t)
Willingness to pay for Dq +(B+C)( B+C)+ ( E+F)/(1−t)+ ( B+C)+(E+F)/(1−t)
Amount paid for Dq −C +C+[F/(1−t)] +aF +(1+a)F −F/(1−t)+ aF/(1−t)
Export taxes −t(F−D)/(1−t)+ t(F−D)/(1−t)
Producers’ income changes
Additional costs DLRMgC DLRMgC DLRMgC
Total (A+B)− ( C+F−A−D)+DLRMgC (a+t)(F−D) +(1+a)(F−D)+ +(D+E)/(1−t)+ ( B+C)+(E+F)/(1−t)+
(B+C)+DLRMgC (1+a)(F−D)/(1−t)+DLRMgC
Source: Figure 6.Shadow Pricing Partially Traded Goods 23
see its revenue affected by the net tax revenue originating in the marginal export revenue
(F − D).
5. Imports: domestic markets are competitive
Demand increases
Let us now consider the case of a domestically produced, but marginally imported
good when the importer has such a big share of the international market that it can affect the
international price (Figure 7). An additional domestic demand for q will increase its
international price, and consequently the domestic one, where producers are price takers. The
additional domestic demand will thus be met by an increase in domestic production (Dq
sd),
a reduction of alternative domestic uses (Dq
d), and an increase in imports (Dq
s − Dq
sd).
We can now turn to those affected (Table 7). The project pays the amount
(F + H + I + G) for the additional demand; domestic consumers lose their CVs of the price
increase (A + B + C + E + F); domestic producers ("factor owners") increase their rents by
(A + B); and the government ceases to receive the taxes corresponding to the alternative use
of the additional foreign exchange needed to finance the additional
Figure 7 An increase in the demand for a marginally imported good24
Table 7. An increase in the domestic demand for a marginally imported input (basic prices are equal and there
are no import taxes or subsidies)
Domestic Domestic Domestic
Project Consumers Producers Government Total Foreigners Total
Domestic consumers
Purchases of q(p1)− ( A+B+C+E)− aE −A−B−C−(1+a)E +E −A−B−C−aE
Willingness to pay for Dq
d −(F+G)− ( F+G)( F+G)
Amount paid for Dq
d −G +G
Domestic producers
Additional income due to DpA A A
Willingness to receive −(C+D)− ( C+D)− ( C+D)
Received +(B+C+D)+ aD +B+C+(1+a)D −D +B+C+aD
Foreign producers




Total −(F+H+I+G)− ( A+B+C+E+F)+ ( A+B)− a(E+F+H+I)+aD −(1+a)(E+F+H+I)+ E+F+H+C −a(E+F+H−D)
(1+a)D−(C+D)−(F+G) −(1+a)I−(F+G)
Source: Figure 7.Shadow Pricing Partially Traded Goods 25
imports (E + F + H + I − D). The sum of the Domestic Total column indicates the
"efficiency" cost of the additional demand, composed of the "efficiency" value of the foreign
exchange needed for the additional imports, plus the marginal cost of producing Dq
sd, plus
the domestic willingness to pay for the amount diverted from alternative uses. By looking
at the last column, we can see that if all producers had been domestic, we would have arrived
at the standard "efficiency" result: the willingness to pay for the diverted consumption plus
the marginal cost of the additional production.
If imports were subject to an ad valorem tax at rate t (Table 7a) government revenue
would be further affected by: the additional taxes generated by the marginal import cost, i.e.
t (E + F + H + I)/( 1+t), less the taxes lost from diverting foreign exchange to this use a
(E + F + H + I)/( 1+t), less the taxes no longer paid on the substituted imports
t D /( 1+t), plus the taxes gained by the alternative use of the foreign exchange so released
a D /( 1+t). The Domestic Total indicates that the efficiency value of the additional
demand equals that of the net additional foreign exchange
(1 + a)(E + F + H + I − D)/( 1+t), plus the efficiency cost of substituting imports
(assumed equal to C + D), plus the willingness to pay for the reduction in domestic
consumption (F + G). In the last column we can see that the traditional result would have
been obtained (willingness to pay for the forgone consumption F + G, plus the cost of the
additional production I), had all producers been domestic.
Supply increases
The case of an increase in the domestic supply of a marginally imported input (Figure
8) when that increase affects the international price, is similar to the preceding one. By
reducing demand in the foreign market, the additional domestic supply (Dq
s + Dq
d) will
reduce price from p0 to p1, increasing domestic consumption by Dq
d, reducing domestic
production by Dq
sd, and substituting imports by Dq
s − Dq
sd. The project will receive
additional revenue for selling Dq
s + Dq
d at the new price p1 (I + G); domestic consumers will
gain the CV of the price reduction (A + B + C + E + F + H); domestic producers will lose
the CV of the price reduction, assumed to equal A + B; and the government will gain the26
Table 7a. An increase in the domestic demand for a marginally imported input (basic prices are equal, there are import
taxes)
Domestic Domestic Domestic
Project Consumers Producers Government Total Foreigners Total
Domestic consumers
Purchases of q(p1)− ( A+B+C+E) (t−a)E/(1+t) −[A+B+C+(1+a)E/(1+t)] +E/(1+t)− ( A+B+C)−aE/(1+t)
Willingness to pay for Dq
d −(F+G)− ( F+G)− ( F+G)




Additional income due to DpA A A
Willingness to receive −(C+D)− ( C+D)− ( C+D)
Received +(B+C+D)+ ( a−t)D/(1+t)+ B+C+(1+a)D/(1+t)− D/(1+t)+ B+C+aD/(1+t)
Foreign producers
Additional income −(F+H+I) (t−a)(F+H+I)/(1+t) −(1+a)(F+H+I)/(1+t)+ ( F+H+I)/(1+t)− a(F+H+I)/(1+t)
Costs of Dqs − Dqsd (−I+C+D)/(1+t)( − I+C+D)/(1+t)
Total −(F+H+I+G)− ( A+B+C+E+F)+ ( A+B) (t−a)(E+F+H+I−D)/(1+t) −(1+a)(E+F+H+I)/(1+t)+ (E+F+H+C)/(1+t)− a(E+F+H−D)/(1+t)
(1+a)D/(1+t)−(C+D)−(F+G) −(1+a)I/(1+t)−(F+G)
Source: Figure 7.Shadow Pricing Partially Traded Goods 27
Figure 8 An increase in the domestic supply of a marginally imported good
additional taxes collected from the alternative use of the foreign exchange released by the
import substitution and by the reduction in the international price.
The Domestic Total column in Table 8 indicates that the "efficiency" value of the
additional supply is the "efficiency" value of the additional foreign exchange
[(1 + a)(E + F + I − D)], plus the "efficiency" value of the resource savings resulting
from the reduction in the supply of other producers, assumed to equal (C + D), plus the
willingness to pay for the additional consumption (H + G). The Total column allows us
to see what the result would have been if all producers had been domestic. Since there
would have been no effects on government revenue (a = 0), we would have obtained the
familiar result: the willingness to pay for the additional consumption (H + G), plus the
"efficiency" value of the resource savings, assumed here to be equal to F + I.
When there are import taxes at an ad valorem rate t (Table 8a), the government
receives additional revenue due to the alternative use of the net foreign exchange liberated
by the import substitution [a (E + F + I − D)/( 1+t)], but sees its import tax revenue
reduced due the reduction in the value of such imports [t (E + F + I − D)/( 1+t)]. The28
Table 8. An increase in the domestic supply of a marginally imported input (basic prices are equal and there
are no import taxes or subsidies)
Domestic Domestic Domestic
Project Consumers Producers Government Total Foreigners Total
Domestic consumers
Purchases of q(p1)( A+B+C+E+F) a(E+F)A + B+C+(1+a)(E+F)− ( E+F)A + B+C+a(E+F)
Willingness to pay for Dq
d (H+G)+ ( H+G)+ ( H+G)
Amount paid for Dq
d +G −G
Domestic producers
Income reduction due to Dp −A −A −A
Willingness to receive +(C+D)+ ( C+D)+ ( C+D)
Received +D −(B+C+D)− ( B+C)− ( B+C)
Foreign producers
Income reduction +(I−D) a(I−D) (1+a)(I−D)− ( I−D) a(I−D)
Cost savings for Dq
s − Dq
sd (F+I)−(C+D)( F+I)−(C+D)
Total +(I+G)( A+B+C+E+F+H)− ( A+B) a(E+F+I−D) −(1+a)(E+F+I−D)+ −(E+C) a(E+F+I−D)
(C+D)+(H+G)+ ( H+G)+(F+I)
Source: Figure 8.Shadow Pricing Partially Traded Goods 29
Domestic Total will be the "efficiency" value of the net foreign exchange earnings, plus the
resource savings originating in reducing production due to the price fall (C + D), plus the
willingness to pay for the additional domestic consumption (H + G). Had the product been
non-traded, the traditional result of willingness to pay for the additional consumption, less
resource savings due to production replacement, would have been obtained.
6. Non-traded products with close traded substitutes
So far, we have considered cases of homogeneous goods. However, in practice, and
particularly in relatively open economies, the additional demand or supply of a non-traded
product may significantly affect the foreign exchange market via the effects on close
substitutes. This is particularly the case when product differentiation exists. Consider, for
example, the case depicted in Figure 9, where non-traded product q has a very close imported
substitute m. An increase in the demand for q will raise its price, and that higher price will
increase the demand for the imported substitute. Consequently, although q is strictly non-
traded (its additional demand is met by increasing its domestic production and withdrawing
it from other users), an additional demand or supply will have an important effect in the
Figure 9 An increase in the domestic demand of a non-traded good with an imported
substitute30
Table 8a. An increase in the domestic supply of a marginally imported input (basic prices are equal, there are import
taxes)
Domestic Domestic Domestic
Project Consumers Producers Government Total Foreigners Total
Domestic consumers
Purchases of q(p1)( A+B+C+E+F)( a−t)(E+F)/(1+t) A+B+C+(1+a)(E+F)/(1+t)− ( E+F)/(1+t) A+B+C+a(E+F)/(1+t)
Willingness to pay for Dq
d (H+G)+ ( H+G)+ ( H+G)
Amount paid for Dqd +G −G
Domestic producers
Income reduction due to Dp −A −A −A
Willingness to receive +(C+D)+ ( C+D)+ ( C+D)
Received +D −(B+C+D)− ( B+C)− ( B+C)
Foreign producers
Income reduction +(I−D)( a−t)(I−D)/(1+t) (1+a)(I−D)/(1+t)− ( I−D)/(1+t) a(I−D)/(1+t)
Cost savings for Dq
s − Dq
sd [(F+I)−(C+D)]/(1+t)[ ( F+I)−(C+D)]/(1+t)
Total +(I+G)( A+B+C+E+F+H)− ( A+B)( a−t)(E+F+I−D)/(1+t) (1+a)(E+F+I−D)/(1+t)+ −(E+C)/(1+t) a(E+F+I−D)/(1+t)
(C+D)+(H+G)+ ( H+G)+(F+I)
Source: Figure 8.Shadow Pricing Partially Traded Goods 31
foreign exchange market through its effect in the market of the imported substitute. In other
words, using an additional demand as an example, the bulk of the reduction in the
consumption of q,( q0 −q s), is in fact compensated by an increase in the consumption of the
imported substitute (Dm).
The example in Figure 9 is presented in Table 9, where the columns for the project,
the consumers, and the producers correspond to the conventional case. However, since the
great majority of amount C previously paid for q0 −q s will now be spent on imported good
m, we specify the effects of that expenditure. The consumers will spend on the imported
good an amount equal to their willingness to pay, and that is why we do not record those
effects (F − F) on the column for the consumers. The importers receive an amount
designated in Figure 9 as F, which we assumed to be equal to the cost of importing
F = p
m Dm =( 1+t) p
b Dm + DC
where p
m is the domestic price of m, Dm are the additional imports of m, t is the import tax
rate, p
b is the border price of m, and DC are the additional costs the importer incurs in order
to sell Dm in the domestic market. Consequently, by assumption, there are no net effects
Table 9. An increase in the demand of a non-traded good with an imported close
substitute
Consumers Producers Importers
Project of q of q of m Government Total
Consumers’ CV
Purchases of q(p0)− A +A
Willingness to pay for Dq −(B+C)− ( B+C)
Amount paid for Dq −C +C
Producers’ income changes
Additional revenue at p1 −(B+D+E)+ ( B+D+E)
Additional costs −E −E
Importers’ income changes





Other domestic costs −(tp
bDm+DC)+ tp
bDm −DC
Total −(B+C+D+E)− ( A+B)+ ( A+B+D)−( t−a)pbDm −(B+C+E)−
(t−a)pbDm
Source: Figure 9.32 Shadow Pricing Partially Traded Goods
on the importers.
9 Government revenue, however, is affected by the difference between the
tax on the imported good and the revenue forgone due to the reallocation of the foreign
exchange. If all income changes were equally valuable, the domestic total would show the
conventional efficiency result plus a term consisting of the difference between the market and
the efficiency prices of m. Note that if t = 0, then the correction amounts to valuing the
foreign exchange at efficiency prices, and that the correction would be worth the additional
work only when the difference t − a (i.e. the difference between the market and the
efficiency price of the imported substitute) were significant.
The case of a non-traded product with an exported close substitute, depicted in
Figure 10, is similar to that of the imported substitute. In this case, a great proportion of the
amount no longer spent on q (area C) is spent on exported good x (area F), sold domestically
at price
p
x =( 1−t) p
b Dx + DC
x
where t is now the ad valorem export tax, p
b is now the border price of x, and DC
x now
represents the additional export costs. As a result (Table 10), and as long as they do not
enjoy extraordinary profits (due, for example, to a quota), exporters are not affected. They
now receive the domestic sales revenue (1 − t) p
b Dx + DC
d, but cease to receive the export
revenue −p
b Dx + tp
b Dx + DC
x. On the cost side, they have to pay for the domestic
distribution costs (−DC
d) while no longer incurring in export distribution costs DC
x. If all
income changes were equally valuable, the Total column would show the conventional result
plus a term capturing the difference between the domestic and the efficiency price of the
exported substitute. Note that if the exported good is taxed, the effects on the traded
substitute will amount to a significant correction. On the other hand, if it is subsidized (a
negative tax) the magnitude of the correction will depend on the difference between the ad
valorem subsidy rate and a.
9 If those effects existed, they could be taken into account by specifying an additional revenue F that is
different from the import cost.Shadow Pricing Partially Traded Goods 33
Figure 10 An increase in the domestic demand of a non-traded good with an exported
substitute
Table 10. An increase in the demand of a non-traded good with an exported close
substitute
Consumers Producers Exporters
Project of q of q of m Government Total
Consumers’ CV
Purchases of q(p0)− A +A
Willingness to pay for Dq −(B+C)− ( B+C)
Amount paid for Dq −C +C
Producers’ income changes
Additional revenue at p1 −(B+D+E)+ ( B+D+E)
Additional costs −E −E
Exporters’ income changes
















Source: Figure 10.34 Shadow Pricing Partially Traded Goods
7. Conclusions
The first important conclusion of this paper is that, as stated by Little and Mirrlees
(1991, p. 353), "marginal foreign revenue alone" is not a good approximation to shadow
pricing partially traded goods, even when income changes are equally valuable regardless of
beneficiary.
The second is that "a good applicable model of the economy" is not necessarily
required in order to reach practical approximations to "hard-to-trace effects" (Little and
Mirrlees, 1991, p. 353). Traditional comparative statics using partial equilibrium analysis
provides an adequate framework for identifying and quantifying the main income changes
according to those affected. The difficult problem, where such model may become necessary,
is that of estimating the appropriate shadow prices for those income changes, whether they
are based on more traditional distributional weights and accounting prices of investment
funds, or on parameters capturing the marginal value of public income to account for the
allocative effects of financing the impact on public sector accounts.
Thirdly, a good may be partially traded even though its international price is not
affected by an additional demand or supply. That is the case of the perfectly discriminating
monopolist facing an infinitely elastic international demand, as well as that of the
domestically produced good with a fully traded substitute. In the case of the perfectly
discriminating monopolist facing an infinitely elastic international demand, it has also been
shown that the good is fully traded for domestic supply increases, because domestic and
international prices are not affected, but it is partially traded for domestic demand increases
because they affect the domestic price.
Also, an important practical case of partially traded goods, particularly in open
economies, has been considered: that of domestically produced goods with close traded
substitutes. In these situations, the presentation shows that practical problems of estimating
income changes in both markets may considerably complicate the appropiate shadow pricing.
Finally, the paper provides an interesting application of the traditional method of
identifying those affected, measuring their corresponding compensating variations, and then
valuing those real income changes using appropriate shadow prices. Its use helps to showShadow Pricing Partially Traded Goods 35
that tracing distributional effects in order to apply shadow prices to marginal income changes
is more complicated in the case of partially traded goods than in the case of fully traded or
non-traded goods. Even more so when there are domestic taxes or subsidies, be they imposed
on either foreign or domestic transactions. Those complications arise not only from the need
of estimating changes in consumers’ surpluses, but also from the difficulties of tracing effects
in more than one market simultaneously, and of properly allocating the effects according to
those affected.
Appendix A
When a project increases the production of a marginally exported good, total
production by the project Dq is absorbed by additional domestic consumption Dq
dd, reductions
in domestic production Dq
ds, additional foreign consumption Dq








Equation [A.1] may also be expressed as a function of the proportional price change Dp/p,
and demand and supply price elasticities:
Dq = Dp/p [q
d
0 (hd + ed)+ q
f







0 is total domestic consumption at price p0, hd is price elasticity of domestic demand,
ed is price elasticity of domestic supply, q
f
0 is total sales in foreign markets, hf is price
elasticity of demand in foreign markets, q
x
0 are total exports of the country where the project
is located, and ef is price elasticity of supply to the international market of the other suppliers.
Once the price change is known, quantity changes may be estimated; for example, the
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